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COMMENTS
THE APPLICATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
TO THE CORPORATION
I. THE PRIGE iN GEmERAL
The attorney-client privilege is a concept deeply imbedded in the English
and American legal systems. It is derived from the common law and does not
depend upon statutory authority for its existence.' Its purpose is to promote
freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients.2 The privilege has been
broadly stated as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.3
The attorney-client privilege is based on the theory that although certain
confidential communications may have evidentiary relevance, "their revelation
will impair the social good derived from the proper performance of the functions
of lawyers for their clients." 4 The privilege is, therefore, one which exists solely
1. United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 926 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
2. Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D. Del. 1970); see Grummons v.
Zollinger, 240 F. Supp. 63, 67 (ND. Ind. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1965). See
also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 929 (1963); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1996); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2291, at 545 (J. McNaughton rev. repL
1961) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
3. Wigmore § 2292, at 554; see NLRB v. Harvey, 264 F. Supp. 770 (W.). Va. 1966);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. fass. 1950). The Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence state the "General Rule of Privilege" as follows: "A client has
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's
representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, or (3) made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, by him
or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest." Propozed
Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03(b), 46 F.RD. 161, 250 (1969). Significantly, under this rule the
client may, in addition to refusing to disclose confidential communications himself, prevent
an eavesdropper from disclosing such communications. The drafting committee noted that
while in the past eavesdroppers were permitted to testify as to overheard or intercepted
privileged communication, "the evolution of more sophisticated techniques of eavesdropping
and interception calls for abandonment of this position." Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03,
Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F.RJ. at 254 [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee's
Note].
4. Comerdo E Industria Continental, SAL v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 19 F.R.D. 513, 514
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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for the benefit of the client, not for the attorney.5 The client need not anticipate
nor contemplate litigation;6 the naked fact that legal service is sought or ren-
dered is sufficient foundation to invoke the privilege, no matter what the circum-
stances may be.7 Furthermore, disclosure of privileged communications may
not be compelled even though the client is not a party to the case in which
discovery is sought.8
The protection afforded by the privilege encompasses not only those commu-
nications made by the client to the attorney but also those communications
made by the attorney to the clientY Acts or services performed by the attorney
for the client are not privileged if no professional "communication" is involved.10
In order to assert the privilege, the client must have intended the communica-
tions to be confidential." So where a person engages an attorney with the un-
5. See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967). ThIs
principle is codified in the Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03(c), 46 F.R.D. at 250-51. Un-
der the original theory, the attorney-client privilege belonged to the attorney, not the
client. It was a consideration for the oath and honor of the attorney, whose first duty was
to keep the client's secrets. Contrary to the modem theory of the privilege which began to
appear in the early eighteenth century, the original theory was not concerned with the
apprehensions of the client. Wigmore § 2290, at 543. See also C. McCormick, Evidence § 96,
at 195 (1954).
6. For a discussion of the related work product rule which requires that litigation be con-
templated see, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Southern Ry. v. Lanham,
403 F.2d 119, 134 (5th Cir. 1968); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47
F.R.D. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F.
Supp. 979, 981 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 247, 250 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. Gates,
35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964); United States v. 38 Cases, 35 F.R.D. 357, 361 (W.D. Pa.
1964), appeal dismissed, 369 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D.
518 (D. Colo. 1963); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D.
416, 420 (D. Del. 1959); Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50
Colum. L. Rev. 1026 (1950).
7. Wigmore § 2295, at 566. See also Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 866 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
8. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967); Wigmore
§ 2321, at 629.
9. See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1968); Hesselbine v. Von
Wedel, 44 F.R.D. 431 (W.D. Okla. 1968); Wigmore § 2320, at 628. Regarding this proposi-
tion, the court in Giordani v. Hoffman, 278 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1968), applying Penn-
sylvania law, qualified it saying: "[T]o prevent abuse of the attorney-client privilege, It has
long been held that privileged communications between an attorney and his client are
confined to confidential communications and knowledge derived wholly or in part from
private and professional intercourse, and do not embrace those facts with which counsel
may become acquainted collaterally . . . ." Id. at 889 (citation omitted).
10. United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680, 685 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 55
(1970).
11. United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v.
Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co.,
15 F.R.D. 461, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
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derstanding that information be conveyed to others, the privilege does not at-
tach.12
Notably, it is the substance of communications which is afforded the protec-
tion of the attorney-client privilege, not the fact that there have been communi-
cations. 3 Thus, the existence of the attorney-client relationship itself is not
privileged 14 nor are the amount of the attorney's fee and the conditions of his
employment.' 5 Moreover, in the absence of unusual circumstances, the identity
of the client is without the protection of the privilege.10 But, when so much of
an actual communication between an attorney and client has already been
revealed that the identification of the client amounts to the disclosure of a con-
fidential communication, the client's identity is privileged.' 7 So where the
disclosure of the client's identity would have led to the disclosure of his motive
for seeking legal advice, it has been held that the attorney may not be compelled
to identify his client.' 8 The mere fact that the client was advised by the attorney
is not privileged; however, if the client should divulge too much and reveal the
substance of counsel's advice, he may find that he has waived the privilege.
19
The privilege also embraces documents entrusted to the attorney by the client
in connection with the matter for which he was retained.20 However, documents
prepared for purposes other than for use by the attorney and which existed
prior to the attorney-client relationship are not privileged even though they are
12. But see United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970), involving income
tax returns, where a slightly different result was reached. There the court held that, aside
from the actual information incorporated in defendant's income tax return by his attorney,
communications concerning the preparation of the return and written materials such as
summaries of defendant's books and financial records prepared for use in the preparation
of the return were within the attorney-client privilege. The court stated that in the present
situation the client intended that only as much of the information would be sent to the
government as the attorney ultimately sent to iL Therefore, that which was not sent was
privileged.
13. United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1964).
14. See In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 384 F.2d 316, 317 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
15. In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); In re
Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564, 566 (D.D.C. 1961).
16. In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); Colton
v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963);
United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944).
17. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965).
18. Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d
623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960).
19. See text accompanying notes 100-23 infra, for a more complete discussion on the sub-
ject of waiver.
20. Blankenship v. Rowntree, 219 F.2d 597, 599-600 (10th Cir. 1955); Baldwin v. Com-
missioner, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942).
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in the hands of the attorney,21 i.e., if the client may be compelled to produce
certain documents, then the attorney may be compelled to produce those same
documents when they are in his possession. 22 But, although the document itself
may not be privileged, the client's communications concerning it made to an
attorney are privileged. 23
The privilege may be invoked to protect from disclosure only communications
made during the attorney-client relationship. 24 Thus, where one continues to
reveal certain matters to an attorney after he refuses to accept employment or
attempts to retain a member of the legal profession whom he knows cannot be
retained due to a legal incapacity, e.g., a judge, the communications are not
privileged. 25 However, those communications in the attorney's possession, ob-
tained in the course of his employment, are privileged even after the attorney-
client relationship has been terninated. 20 Accordingly, such communications
remain privileged even after the client's death.2T
The attorney-client privilege, in addition to protecting the substance of
communications between the attorney and client, protects the substance of
communications between the attorney and his representative or agent whose
consultation or advice is necessary to adequately and properly serve the client.28
21. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963); United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. Neb. 1970).
22. In re Ruppert, 309 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1962). It is simply a question of possession,
and the attorney in such a case is like any other agent. Wigmore § 2307, at 591.
23. In re Scranton Corp., 37 F.R.D. 465, 468-69 (M.D. Pa. 1965); Wigmore § 2308, at
595-96.
24. Wigmore § 2304, at 586.
25. Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), aff'd mem., 339 U.S. 974 (1950)
(aff'd for lack of a quorum); Wigmore § 2304, at 587.
26. United States v. Foster, 309 F.2d 8, 15 (4th Cir. 1962).
27. Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir. 1942); Wigmore § 2323, at
631. Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03(c), 46 F.R.D. at 250-51, provides, inter alla, that
the successor of a dissolved corporation may claim the privilege.
28. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 906-07 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) ("What is vital to the privilege is that the communication
be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer." (empha-
sis omitted)); see United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
While an accountant's work and communications may be privileged when he is aiding
the attorney to represent a client, there would be no privilege without the attorney. The
federal courts do not recognize an accountant-client privilege or work product of an ac-
countant. United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1009 (1970); In re Rashba & Pokart, 271 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Proposed
Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03 (a) (4), 46 F.R.D. at 250, in defining "representative of the law-
yer," specifically provides that the attorney may employ assistants in the process of render-
ing legal services without destroying the attorney-client privilege. Rule 5-03(a)(3), In
defining "representative of the client," is broad enough to protect communications between
the client and an expert employed by him to assist in the planning of litigation but not
one hired to testify as a witness. Advisory Committee's Note 253. See also Proposed Fed.
R. of Evidence 5-03(b)(2). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A),(B) which permit
discovery of the facts known and opinions held by an expert.
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Similarly privileged are communications among attorneys representing the same
party.29 However, where an attorney represents two parties having a common
interest, communications from either, while protected by the privilege from
disclosure to a third person, are not privileged from disclosure to the other.30
Where several attorneys representing several different clients exchange informa-
tion in confidence in order to apprise each other as to the nature and scope of a
proceeding, the privilege applies to those communications if the clients all have
some common interest in the same litigation.3'
The attorney-client privilege not only applies in judicial proceedings, but also
in investigative proceedings conducted by administrative agencies 3 2 If the rule
were otherwise, the purpose of the privilege-to assure the client that his con-
fidences will be kept-would be easily frustrated. Thus, the privilege has been
held applicable in investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission,M
by the Internal Revenue Service,3 4 and by the Civil Aeronautics Board.a5 Con-
fidential communications are similarly protected in grand jury investigations 0
and legislative committee hearings.3 7
29. New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 285 F. Supp. 868 (D. Kan.
1968). It was held in this case that inter-office memoranda among attorneys regularly em-
ployed in a corporation's claim department were privileged where they contained informa-
tion for submission to outside counsel for the purpose of securing its legal advice.
30. E.g., La Rocca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278, 280 (W.D. Pa.
1969); Wigmore § 2312, at 603-04. This is the so-called "joint client" exception to the
attorney-client privilege. The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence codify this principle
in subsection (5) of Rule 5-03(d) which also codifies four other well-established excep-
tions. There would be no privilege as a result of this rule: (1) where the attorney's services
were sought in order to aid anyone to commit a crime or fraud; or (2) with respect to
communications relevant to an issue between parties who each claim through the same
deceased client; or (3) with respect to communications relating to an issue of breach of
duty by the attorney to his client (see text accompanying note 115 infra); or (4) with
respect to communications relevant to an issue concerning a document to which the at-
torney is an attesting witness. Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03(d), 46 F.R.D. at 251.
31. Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964). Proposed
Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03(b) (3), 46 F.R.D. at 250, provides that a client or an attorney
may speak to an attorney representing another in a matter of common interest without
losing the privilege, and gives each client a privilege as to his own communications, allowing
one client, if he wishes, to disclose his own statements made at a joint conference. Ad-
visory Committee's Note 255. See note 3 supra for a full statement of Rule 5-03(b).
32. United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 927 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
33. See McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 US. 684 (1937); SEC
v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948), vacated per curiam as moot, 340 U.S. 903
(1951). See also 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1959 n.42 (2d ed. 1961).
34. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Higgins,
266 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
35. CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) ("The very existence of
the right of counsel necessitates the attorney-client privilege in order that a client and his
attorney may communicate between themselves freely and confidentially.").
36. Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964).
37. See United States v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 19S3) (dictum), rev'd on
other grounds, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
1970]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
1H. THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE TO CORPORArTIONS
A. Generally
The case law makes it clear that the attorney-client privilege applies to
corporations. The leading case in the federal courts 8 which directly held that
a corporation is entitled to assert the privilege was Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Association0 decided in 1963. However, prior to this decision,
the application of the privilege to the corporation had long been assumed.4
For example, one judge had remarked, "the availability of the privilege to cor-
porations has gone unchallenged so long and has been so generally accepted
that I must recognize that it does exist. '41
Radiant Burners arose under a civil antitrust action where the plaintiff
38. This comment will only discuss the application of the privilege in the federal courts.
This limitation is necessary due to the extensive scope of the topic. The applicability of
state or federal law with respect to the attorney-client privilege is usually determined by
the manner by which the federal court gained jurisdiction. If the action involves a federal
question, federal law will apply. See Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 US. 951 (1963); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953). If, however, jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship, the determination of applicable law rests upon the procedural-substantive
test outlined in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Some decisions have held
that the privilege is a matter of procedure, like much of the law of evidence, and thus
federal law is applicable. See Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 5
(N.D. Ohio 1953); 4 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ff 26.64[5J (2d ed. 1970). There-
fore, the federal courts while respecting state statutes regarding privilege should be free
to interpret the concept of privilege in their own way. Mariner v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 202 F. Supp. 430, 433 (NJ). Ohio 1962). On the other hand, the majority of
the federal courts have held that, in diversity cases, the law of the forum state defining
the privilege is required by the "Erie doctrine" since the privilege is actually a substantive
matter, i.e., one that will substantially affect the outcome of the case. See Baird v. Koerner,
279 F.2d 623, 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1960); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Constr.
Co., 285 F. Supp. 868, 869 (D. Kan. 1968); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.
Supp. 515, 517 (S.D. Cal. 1963). See also La Rocca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1969). For a discussion concerning the applicability of state
created privileges as codified in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, see Advisory
Committee's Note 243-48.
39. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). This decision reversed
the district court's holding in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp.
771 (NJ). Ill. 1962), that the corporation is not entitled to assert the attorney-client
privilege.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); Belanger
v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d 87, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1950); Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917, 918 (D.N.J. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 284
F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813 (1961) ; Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v.
United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Radio Corp. of America v.
Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. IIl. 1955).
41. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa.),
mandamus denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
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sought discovery of certain documents claimed by the defendant corporation
to be immune therefrom by reason of the attorney-client privilege.4 2 In reversing
the district court's holding, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for-
mally established the privilege for corporations, concluding that "the privilege is
that of a 'client' without regard to the non-corporate or corporate character of
the client... .'43 However, the court expressly declined to decide the limitations
to be imposed in the application of the privilege to the corporation."4 Such
matters were left for development by further case law.
B. House Counsel
Just as the attorney-client privilege may be asserted by a corporation with
respect to its outside counsel, it is equally clear that it may be asserted with
respect to its house counsel.45 In United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.,40 Judge Wyzanski concluded that if the requirements 47 necessary to
claim the attorney-client privilege were complied with, then the apparent
differences between house counsel and outside counsel were not sufficient to dis-
tinguish the two for purposes of the attorney-client privilege.48 In Georgia-Pacific
Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp.,4 the plaintiff sought production
of certain communications between the defendant corporation and its house
counsel. In a well reasoned opinion, the court announced, "[t]he fact that [de-
fendant's house counsel] was a corporate employee rather than an autonomous
lawyer does not exclude him from the position of 'attorney' within the privi-
42. 320 F.2d at 316.
43. Id. at 322. "It is our considered judgment that based on history, principle, precedent
and public policy the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available to corpora-
tions, and we so hold." Id. at 323. This principle has since been followed by all courts
considering the problem. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263 (1964) (Appendix
I to concurring opinion of Douglas, J.) ; United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969); Lee Nat'1 Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp.
224, 226 (D. Del. 1970). See also Proposed Fed. L of Evidence 5-03(a)(1), 46 F.R.ID. at
249-50, which specifically includes the corporation in the definition of "client."
44. 320 F.2d at 323.
45. E.g., Malco Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 45 F.R.D. 24 (D. Minn. 1968); Hogan v.
Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308 (NJ). OkL. 1967), modified sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 656
(10th Cir. 1968); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.RLD.
463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
46. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
47. These requirements are that: "(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication
is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client." Id. at 358-59.
48. Id. at 360.
49. 18 F.1-D. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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lege." 50 Furthermore, the same training, skill and professional integrity, are
required for both outside counsel and house counsel. The court then added that
"[t]he primary requirement is the same for both, that 'in connection with this
communication' they [house counsel] act as lawyers." 1
The court in Georgia-Pacific decided a second issue which was crucial to the
extension of the privilege to house counsel, especially to those in large corpora-
tions that maintain offices in more than one state. The question raised was
whether one could claim the privilege if he had not been admitted to the bar
of the state in which he practiced law as house counsel but had been admitted
to the bar elsewhere.52 Although Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe did not specif-
ically hold that house counsel must be a member of the local bar to qualify for
the privilege, his decision has sometimes been thought to mean just that." How-
ever, the court in Georgia-Pacific thought otherwise and agreed with the
statement in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America,54 that "[b]ar
membership should properly be of the court for the area wherein the services
are rendered, but this is not a sine qua non ... "r Thus, the defendant's house
counsel in Georgia-Pacific was entitled to the status of attorney for purposes of
the privilege, since to hold otherwise, the court said, would not recognize the
realities which exist in representing a corporation which does business in more
than one state.55
Significantly, Rule 5-03 (a) (2) r 7 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
departs from the conventional definition of a lawyer for purposes of the privilege.
It does not require that the lawyer be a member of the bar of the state in
which he is practicing, but only requires that the client reasonably believe that
he is a member of some bar. The definition embodied in this rule indicates a
realization by the drafters of the Proposed Rules that the theory of the privi-
lege-unless the client is assured that his communications will be kept in the
50. Id. at 464. The court came to this conclusion on the basis of Judge Wyzanslf's
second requirement set forth in note 47 supra.
51. Id. (emphasis added). See also Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D.
5, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
52. Id. at 465.
53. Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale LJ.
953, 972 (1956).
54. 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
55. Id. at 794. The court continued with several examples of when the privilege would
apply to lawyers not members of the local bar: "[V]isiting counsel, long distance services
by correspondence, pro hac vice services, 'house counsel' who practice law only for the
corporate client and its affiliates and not for the public generally, for which local authorities
do not insist on admission to the local bar." Id.
56. 18 F.R.D. at 465-66. See Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp.
249 (E.D. Wis. 1963). In Georgia-Pacific, the court declined to extend the privilege, as
suggested by Wigmore, to attorneys regardless of whether they have been admitted to the
bar of any state. 18 F.R.D. at 466. See Model Code of Evidence rule 209(b) (1942); Uni-
form Rule of Evidence 26(3) (c); Wigmore § 2302, at 584.
57. "A 'lawyer' is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be
authorized, to practice law in any state or nation." 46 F.R.D. at 250.
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strictest confidence, he will not disclose all relevant facts-requires that the
client's reasonable belief that his advisor is an attorney should alone entitle him
to the privilege. 58 Furthermore, this definition does not require that the nation
or state which licensed the attorney recognize the attorney-client privilegeW
Once it was established that house counsel qualified for the privilege, other
problems had to be resolved since very often such attorneys also act in the
capacity of businessmen. For this reason the attorney-client relationship cannot
be presumed to exist solely because of the fact that the corporate client has
consulted the attorney as it can be when the individual consults one. co The
privilege applies when house counsel is rendering professional legal services in
the capacity of an attorney,61 but does not if he is advising his corporate em-
ployer only as to business matters.6 2 Ministerial or clerical services are clearly
not privileged. 63 Nor is the privilege available to allow a corporation to funnel
its papers and documents into its attorney's files to avoid disclosure.0 4
The courts have shown an awareness of the realities of today's practice of
law and have exhibited flexibility with respect to communications containing
not only legal advice, but business advice as well. Therefore, house counsel, or
outside counsel for that matter, may still be performing in his capacity as at-
torney although his legal advice is mixed with business advice. If the advice
is primarily legal, the privilege will not be lost.65 If, however, it is primarily
business advice, the privilege may not be asserted.60 Such a determination in-
volves a question of degree and quantity; it requires the court to examine these
58. See also Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 FR.D.
463, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Wigmore § 2302, at 584.
59. Advisory Committee's Note 252. It is interesting to note that the Model Code of
Evidence rule 209(b) (1942) would still maintain the requirement that the licensing author-
ity recognize the privilege.
60. Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role
of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev, 235, 244 (1961).
6L Air-Shield, Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 46 F.R.D. 96, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
62. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943) (advice
concerning price control).
63. United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1027 (1969).
64. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 Fad 314, 324 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 US. 929 (1963).
65. "The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not only what is
permissible but also what is desirable. . . . His duty to society as well as to his client
involves many relevant social, economic, political and philosophical considerations. And the
privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are
expressly stated in a communication which also includes legal advice!' Unlted States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). Thus, the determination of
whether or not the privilege applies to house counsel in a particular situation rests upon the
kind of advice sought or given (Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privilege, I5
Prac. Law., Nov. 1969, at 15, 20) or the nature of the services performed. Withrow, How to
Preserve the Privilege, 15 Prac. Law., Nov. 1969, at 30, 36.




"mixed" communications to decide whether or not the legal matter predomi-
nates.6 7 Similarly, the fact that the communication contains technical informa-
tion in addition to legal advice, does not destroy the privilege. Thus, in Natia
v. Zletz, 8 it was held that correspondence between house counsel and outside
counsel, being communications for legal advice and assistance, clearly fell within
the protection of the attorney-client privilege, and it was immaterial that some
of the correspondence referred to technical or published information.0 9
C. The Corporate Client
Perhaps the most difficult aspect involved in applying the privilege to a
corporation is determining when the corporation is the client. Various suggestions
have been made with respect to this determination, 70 but the most widely ac-
cepted one seems to be the control group test.7 1
The best explanation of the control group test is found in City of Philadel-
phia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,72 where the court stated:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a
position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action
which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an autho-
rized member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or
personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply.73
67. Various approaches are used by courts in order to make this determination. See, e.g.,
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962) (look
to the relative time spent in the role of attorney and the time spent in business affairs).
See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
68. 418 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1969).
69. Id. at 637. Although the claim that communications to and from a patent depart-
ment are privileged was rejected in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp.
357 (D. Mass. 1950), on the finding that the patent department did not generally supply
legal advice, it is clear that if a patent attorney did act in such a capacity, the privilege
would apply. Malco Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 45 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D. Minn. 1968) (certain
documents which constituted legal advice between the engineering department and the at-
tomey heading the patent department were protected from disclosure by the attorney-
client privilege). See 8 In 1 Pet Prods., Inc. v. Swift & Co., 218 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
70. See, e.g., Burnham, Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-
Client Privilege and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 Ill. 3.J. 542, 544 (1968); Simon, supra
note 53, at 963.
71. See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968); Garrison v. General
Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 520 (S.D. Cal. 1963); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules
Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1962).
72. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirk-
patrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
73. Id. at 485. The court added that, "Eiln all other cases the employee would be
merely giving information to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in the corpora-
tion having the authority to act or refrain from acting on the advice." Id.
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The test requires that the corporate employee have actual authority, not merely
apparent authority, to participate in corporate decisions. 4
Criticism of the test has ranged from describing it as artificial, 7m to declaring
that it makes no sense as a limit on sources of privileged communications."
Indeed, the test is inflexible and seems, at times, to be blind to the realities of
corporate practice. It is unrealistic to confine the control group to the superior
executives of a corporation when many times it is the lower executive who, in
fact, is responsible for making decisions or recommendations which are often
merely ratified by a control group member.7 7 While it is true that to blanket all
employees' disclosures with the cloak of the attorney-client privilege would re-
sult in keeping too much information within the corporation,78 at least some
compromise should be found. The line of demarcation below which the privilege
would not apply should be lowered to facilitate a more realistic application of
the attorney-client privilege. Despite the fact that it leaves much to be desired,
the control group test has been adopted by many courts.70
However, the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Harper & Row Publishers,
Izc. v. Decker80 cast doubt upon the validity of the control group test, as de-
fined in City of Philadelphia, as the sole determinant of the identity of the
client. The court of appeals concluded that the control group test was "not
wholly adequate" and that the attorney-client privilege protects communications
of some corporate agents who fall outside the control group.81 The court stated:
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is suffi-
ciently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's
74. Id. Utilizing this test it was held that defendant's employee was not the corporate
client because he failed to fulfill the requirements set forth. Id. at 486.
75. Schaefer, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Modern Business Corporation, 20
Bus. Law. 989, 993 (1965).
76. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege In The Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. Law. 901,
907 (1969).
77. Schaefer, supra note 75, at 993.
78. Simon, supra note 53, at 958.
79. See notes 71, 72 supra. Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03(a) (3), 46 F.R.D. at
250, authorizes the use of the control group test as promulgated by the court in City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus de-
nied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 943 (1963), in order to determine who may speak confidentially for the corpora-
tion. The drafting committee of the Proposed Rules selected this test because in the case
of large corporations there are many people involved and the hierarchy of officials is so
intricate that a line had to be drawn somewhere, otherwise it would be almost impossible
to find the facts. It was the opinion of the committee that this was a situation where the
public policy in favor of obtaining the information outweighed the protection from pos-
sible disclosure of communications between the lower corporate employees and the at-
torney. See A Discussion of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence before the Annual
judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 48 F.R.D. 39, 46, S1
(1969).
80. 423 F2d 487 (7th Cir.), afl'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 39 U.S.L.W.
4100 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1971).
81. Id. at 491.
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attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction
of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the at-
torney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the
performance by the employee of the duties of his employment. 82
The court declined to express an opinion with respect to the communications
of employees about matters which have nothing to do with duties of their em-
ployment, i.e., "about matters as to which they are virtually indistinguishable
from bystander witnesses."83 However, the Seventh Circuit's opinion in a case
decided only several months before Harper & Row suggests that the statements
of such employees would not qualify as statements of the corporate client and
be thereby privileged.8 4 This, in conjunction with its holding that the privilege
protects the communications of "some" corporate employees who are not within
the control group, and not all corporate employees, indicates that the court in
Harper & Row has merely set forth a test in addition to the control group
test, extending the privilege to include communications between an attorney
and employees similarly situated as those in that case. Significantly, the Harper
& Row decision clearly demonstrates one court's reluctance to be bound solely
by the restrictive control group test as several other courts8" have considered
themselves to be in recent years.
Although Rule 5-03 (a) (3) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence au-
thorizes the control group test,86 a result similar to Harper & Row would perhaps
be reached under Rule 5-03 (a) (5) which, in defining confidential communica-
tions, permits some disclosure to be made to persons beyond the attorney and
client and their representatives without destroying the privilege; it allows dis-
closure to persons "to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition" of
legal services.8 7 Persons contemplated by this definition would include a "busi-
ness associate, or joint client.18 8 In addition, disclosure may be made to persons
"reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication."80 The
distinction between subdivision (3) and subdivision (5) is that the former deals
82. Id. at 491-92.
83. Id. at 491.
84. Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146, 154 (7th Cir. 1969) ("This is true of defen-
dant's statements given by its servants and agents in this case. None were of such rank as
to qualify as representative of the corporate cllent.").
85. See cases cited at notes 71, 72 supra. In Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970), the court, notwithstanding the decision in Harper &
Row several weeks before, relied solely upon the control group test, observing in a footnote
that even under the Seventh Circuit's extension of the privilege, it could not determine
"whether the communications were at the direction of their superiors, and whether the
communications were within the scope of their duties." Id. at 120 n.1.
86. See note 79 supra.
87. "A communication is 'confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons
other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal
services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communica-
tion." Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence 5-03(a)(5), 46 F.R.D. at 250.
88. Advisory Committee's Note 254.
89. See note 87 supra.
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with those who are parties to the communication, while the latter concerns itself
with persons, such as corporate employees, who are used in the process of com-
municating.90
It is important to note that where the privilege attaches to the communications
of the employee making the disclosure, it is the privilege of the corporation and
not the employee's. For example, in United States v. Piccini,0 1 the defendant
was convicted of fraudulent concealment of the assets of the bankrupt corpora-
tion of which he was an officer. The defendant contended that the lower court
erred in allowing the corporation's attorney to testify that defendant had in-
structed him to apply proceeds of certain corporate claims in partial reduction
of defendant's personal indebtedness to the attorney. It was argued that these
statements were made in the attorney-client context and were therefore privi-
leged. Rejecting this contention, the court held that this instruction was given
by the defendant "as an officer of the corporation, so that the privilege, if any,
was that of the corporation, and may not be availed of by [the defendant].'*2
Of course, if the attorney represents both the corporation and the employee,
then the employee may claim the privilege. 3
D. Shareholder Derivative Suits
A most perplexing problem in the application of the privilege to the corpora-
tion is presented by the shareholder derivative lawsuit. In view of the increasing
number of such cases in recent years, the problem is one of enormous concern
to corporate management and its counsel." In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,05 the
Fifth Circuit held that a corporation was not barred from asserting the at-
torney-client privilege simply because those demanding disclosure were share-
holders. However, the court added:
[W]here the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimi-
cally to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the cor-
poration and of the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to
the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the
particular instance.96
90. See Advisory Committee's Note 253.
91. 412 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 917 (1970).
92. Id. at 593.
93. Continental Oi Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
94. Burnham, supra note 76, at 902.
95. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), vacating 280 F. Supp. 1018 (NJ). Ala. 1968), which
held that a corporation may not assert the attorney-client privilege to protect communica-
tions from disclosure to its own stockholders in a suit brought by them against the corpo-
ration.
96. Id. at 1103-04 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the court added that "[t]his ap-
proach is neither new nor world-shaking. At common law the stockholder has the right
to see corporate books and records but it is not unlimited. His demand must be germane
to his interest as stockholder, and the interests of the corporation and other shareholders




The court has, it would seem, made the attorney-client privilege a qualified
privilege in shareholder derivative suits by permitting disclosure of confidential
communications upon a showing by the shareholders of "good cause."9 17 The
court listed "many indicia that may contribute to a decision of presence or ab-
sence of good cause,"9g but did not set forth a clear or well-defined basis for
determining when it does in fact exist. Without such a well-defined basis it may
be relatively easy to meet this requirement and force divulgence.
The decision in Garner, by making the privilege a qualified one in derivative
suits will perhaps foster a greater measure of accountability by corporate man-
agement to the shareholders of the corporation. Furthermore, the decision has
merit because, while it is true that the corporate entity is separate from the
shareholders, they are, nevertheless, its owners in whose interests management
acts.99 The argument can be made then, that for these reasons the corporation
should not be able to assert the privilege against its owners. In addition, in
shareholder derivative suits the shareholders are suing in behalf of the corpora-
tion so that the corporation, in effect, would be asserting the privilege against
itself.
On the other hand, the decision in Garner may seriously hamper effective
corporate management. With the limited protection now afforded it in share-
holder suits, management may be less inclined to seek the advice of counsel and
less apt to make full disclosures to its attorneys. Moreover, at times shareholder
derivative suits are brought as nuisances. The disclosure of privileged matter
in such suits could be abused, leading to the institution of more and more of
these suits for the purpose of obtaining confidential matter. By setting forth
the requirement of "good cause," the court has attempted to obviate such a
situation; however, the indicia of "good cause" seem too vague to prevent such
abuses. The more compelling policy interests in shareholder derivative suits
would seem to call for granting to the corporation the absolute right to assert
the attorney-client privilege against its shareholders, or, at least, limited or
strictly defined circumstances under which the shareholders may obtain dis-
closure.
E. Waiver of the Privilege
Once the corporation has been found to be entitled to assert the attorney-
client privilege, it must be careful not to waive it, an action which the corporate
97. 430 F.2d at 1104.
98. Id. "[T]he number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they represent;
the bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether
it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having
the information and the availability of it from other sources; whether, if the share-
holders' claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action criminal, or illegal
but not criminal, or of doubtful legality; whether the communication related to past or to
prospective actions; whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation It-
self; the extent to which the communication is identified versus the extent to which the
shareholders are blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information
in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons." Id.
99. This reasoning was used by the court in deciding that the shareholders should not
be barred from obtaining confidential communications. Id. at 1103-04.
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client, by virtue of its size, may find difficult to avoid. The attorney-client
privilege is waived by the voluntary disclosure of the substance of privileged
matter. 00 However, since the purpose of the privilege is to benefit the client by
allowing its communications with counsel to remain confidential, only the client
may intentionally waive it.'0 ' Furthermore, where several clients consult jointly,
one client may waive only his own statements; he cannot waive another's
statements.
0 2
The attorney is duty-bound to invoke the privilege in his client's behalf. 0 3
He may neither waive the privilege intentionally nor unwittingly without the
client's authority to do so.' 0 4 Thus, in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Shields,05 plaintiff's attorneys were mistakenly allowed to copy certain docu-
ments claimed by the defendant to be privileged. The court ruled that because
the defendant did not intend to waive the privilege, no waiver could be effec-
tuated:
Only the client can waive this privilege and, to support a finding of waiver, there must
be evidence that he intended to waive it .... [Defendant's counsel] swears that any
documents seen and copied ... were permitted to be disclosed only by inadvertence
.... I find that plaintiffs' acquisition of these documents was not under such circum-
stances as to constitute a waiver by defendant.' 00
The question of waiver by one's attorney is more acute when the attorney
is house counsel. It has been suggested by one commentator that while outside
counsel has no right to waive the privilege without the client's consent, house
counsel probably has the implied authority to do so.10 7 Where the attorney is
also a corporate director and makes certain disclosures as a corporate agent
rather than as a legal advisor the privilege will be waived.' 08 Similarly, an at-
torney who has express authority to deal with a third party would seem to
have implied authority to disclose information received from his client with
respect to that transaction if he is acting in the dual capacity of a business
agent and an attorney.x0 9
10O. See Proposed Fed. R. of Evidence 5-11, 46 F.R.D. at 280.
101. Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1965); American Cyanamid Co.
v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Del. 1962).
102. A waiver must be joint for joint communications. Continental Oil Co. v. United
States, 330 F.2d 347, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Scranton Corp., 37 F.R.D. 465, 469-70
(M.D. Pa. 1965).
103. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967).
104. Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. M ih.
1966); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57, 64 (NJ). Ohio 1964)
("only the client can unseal his attorney's lips"). It is Wigmore's contention that an at-
torney can waive the privilege since he has implied authority to make admissions and to
act in all that is relative to the management of the cause. Wigmore § 2325, at 633.
105. 18 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
106. Id. at 451 (citations omitted). See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 38 F.R.D. 57, 64 (NJ). Ohio 1964).
107. Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilege as it Relates to Corporations, 53 I
BJ. 376, 386-87 (1965).
108. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753-54 (D. Del. 1943).
109. Simon, supra note 53, at 986; see United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 742
(S.D. Cal 1953); Rediker v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125, 127-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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Those corporate agents who have the authority to employ or consult an at-
torney in behalf of the corporation would also have the authority to waive the
privilege. 110 Disclosure by such agents to others within the group having similar
authority clearly would not effectuate a waiver,"' but a disclosure to one out-
side the group would." 2
A waiver of the privilege may be oral, and need not be in any particular
form." 3 For example, the privilege will be waived by a reference in the plead-
ings to the content of privileged communications. 1 4 If the client alleges a
breach of duty or assails his attorney's conduct of the case, such as where he
seeks to vacate his conviction on the ground that he was inadequately represented
at trial, the privilege will be waived as to all communications relevant to that
issue.115 Similarly, if the client discloses not the mere fact that he acted upon
the advice of counsel, but the substance of counsel's advice, he has waived the
privilege. 16
If the client waives the privilege with respect to some documents or com-
munications relating to a specific subject, then he has waived the privilege as to
the other documents relating to that specific subject. 1 7 But a disclosure of
privileged matter relating to a particular subject is not a waiver of privileged
matter relating to other subjects." 8 Furthermore, the waiver must relate to the
content of the privileged matter not only to its existence. 9 Thus, where a party
volunteered certain portions of his conversations with his attorney without in-
tending to disclose the whole breadth of discussions, since he only admitted in
a general way that certain conversations took place, it was held that there was
a waiver as to those immediate exchanges with counsel, but not as to all com-
munications.' 20 Similarly, in International Business Machines Corp. v. Sperry
110. See Simon, supra note 53, at 986.
111. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 253 (N.D.N.Y.
1960).
112. See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
However, it has been held that where a paragraph of an inter-office communication
between non-legal personnel contained legal advice received by the corporate client from Its
counsel, the privilege was not lost. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp.
251, 253 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
113. In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
114. TWA v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 615 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 380 U.S. 248
(1965).
115. Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1967); Sherman v. United
States, 261 F. Supp. 522 (D. Hawaii 1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1967).
116. See generally Sbawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 12 F.R.D. 488 (D. Mass.
1952); United States v. Monti, 100 F. Supp. 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
117. Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970); In re Associ-
ated Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F. Supp. 743, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
118. In re Prudence-Bonds Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643, 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 174
F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949); see Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 258 F. Supp.
233 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
119. Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mich.
1966).
120. Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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Rand Corp.,12' the defendant disclosed privileged information to a third party
to the limited extent that it dealt with the defects in a certain computer pur-
chased by the third party from the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the
privilege was waived by the defendant's partial disclosure. The court disagreed
and limited the defendant's waiver to the specific subject of the disclosure:
No reason has been suggested, and none appears in the record before the Court for
construing the waiver other than as limited to this specific subject, to wit, defects in
the [computer] .... This narrow reading of the scope of the waiver will ... foster
the free disclosure which the privilege is designed to encourage while protecting against
misuse of the privilege to distort or mislead. -2
Once the attorney-client privilege has been waived it cannot be restored by
any subsequent claim of privilege. However, in order to accomplish "some
measure of repair," Rule 5-12 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
provides for the exclusion of evidence which is the result of a disclosure com-
pelled erroneously or made without the opportunity to claim the privilege.m
m. CONCLUSION
The availability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations has been
expanded from a rather narrow application at its inception into a broader and
more pliable set of legal principles. The courts in many instances have, however,
failed to address themselves to the fact that the corporation has special prob-
lems which individuals do not, and its need to consult legal counsel is equal to
if not greater than that of the individual. Indeed, the corporation must con-
stantly seek its attorney's advice in order to conform in its business dealings
with the current requirements of the law. Without the concomitant privilege of
confidentiality the right to counsel is a franchise devoid of its assets. Many
decisions indicate a reluctance on the part of the courts to fully apply the at-
torney-client privilege to the corporate client. The corporation, it is now consis-
tently held, is a client for purposes of the privilege, however, in the application
of the privilege, the corporation is not placed on a par with the individual
client. As pointed out elsewhere, "[t]he more deeply one is convinced of the
social necessity of permitting corporations to consult frankly and privately with
their legal advisors, the more willing one should be to accord them a flexible
and generous protection. 1 2 4 There appears to be no sound policy in stating that
the privilege is applicable while not giving it full effect.
Harper & Row and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence are both very
encouraging developments for the corporation. The former, by placing communi-
cations with some corporate agents outside the control group within the pro-
tection of the privilege, and the latter, in realizing that "[p] racticality requires
121. 44 F.R.D. 10 (D. Del. 1968).
122. Id. at 13.
123. Proposed Fed. P_ of Evidence 5-12, 46 F.R.D. at 281. "Evidence of a statement or
other disclosure of privileged matter is inadmissible against the holder of the privilege if
the disclosure was (a) compelled erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim
the privilege." Id.
124. Simon, supra note 53, at 990.
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that some disclosure be allowed beyond the immediate circle of lawyer-client,"' 25
indicate that the judiciary, at least in some circuits, and the drafters of the
Rules are responsive to the legitimate needs of the corporate client. Garner, on
the other hand, may show a certain reluctance of the courts to fully apply the
privilege to the corporation.
The attorney-client privilege has become increasingly valuable to the cor-
poration. 126 It is a privilege which is essential to the proper relationship of an
attorney and his client whether the attorney is house counsel or outside counsel
and whether the client is an individual or a corporation. An even hand should
rule in both instances.
125. Advisory Committee's Note 254.
126. Schaefer, supra note 75, at 995.
